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Abstract:       
Many companies operate units which are dispersed across different types of markets, and thus 
serve significantly diverging customer bases. Such market-type dispersion is likely to 
compromise the headquarters' ability to control its local managers' behavior and satisfy the 
divergent needs of different types of customers. In this paper we find evidence that market-type 
dispersion is an important determinant of delegation and the provision of incentives. Using a 
sample of convenience store chains, we show that market-type dispersion is related to the degree 
of franchising at the chain level as well as the probability of franchising a given store within a 
chain. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of market-type dispersion and to other 
determinants of franchising such as the stores' geographic distance from headquarters and 
geographic dispersion. Additional analyses also suggest that chains that do not franchise at all, 
may cope with market-type dispersion by decentralizing operations from headquarters to their 
stores, and, to a weaker extent, by providing higher variable pay to their store managers.  
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Organizational Design and Control across Multiple Markets:  
The Case of Franchising in the Convenience Store Industry 
 
I. Introduction 
Many companies operate multiple business units that serve widely diverse types of markets 
(i.e., customers). Companies expand into different markets for many reasons: to leverage the 
organization’s competencies, to diversify risks, to strengthen the company’s brand name, to 
achieve economies of scale, etc. The most common types of organizations serving multiple 
markets are chain organizations. For example, a bank may diversify risks by offering credit and 
savings services to different communities; a hotel chain may achieve economies of scale by 
operating in different countries; and a supermarket chain may replicate its basic business model 
by opening multiple stores in markets that serve a broad range of customers.  
Despite the advantages of serving multiple markets, companies that serve a diversity of 
clients face significant control problems due to the information asymmetries between the units 
facing the customers and the headquarters. In these settings, the relative expertise of 
headquarters is likely to be diminished vis-à-vis local management. This study focuses on 
describing the control problems that emerge from serving customers in a diversity of markets, 
and explores ways in which companies respond to this problem through their organizational 
design and control choices. 
We define the variation in customer demands across different locations as market-type 
dispersion. Market-type dispersion is not necessarily associated with geographic dispersion 
because (1) a company’s units can be close to each other geographically but still have sharply 
diverging types of customers (e.g. convenience stores in the ethnic neighborhoods of Chicago   3
serve customers of entirely different ethnicities, despite being just a few blocks apart), and (2) a 
company’s units can be geographically distant among each other and yet have similar customer 
bases.  
While unit managers typically have authority over some operational decisions such as 
managing inventory levels or client relationships, significant strategic and operational decisions 
are often retained by the headquarters, such as advertising, purchasing, or selecting the service or 
product mix. However, it is more challenging to retain control over these overarching decisions 
at the headquarters when market-type dispersion is high. Specifically, market-type dispersion 
leads to two control problems: First, from a corporate perspective, relative differences in local 
conditions make it more difficult for the headquarters to monitor and control managers serving 
different markets (Landier et al. 2006). Second, from a demand perspective, a company with 
wide ranging customer bases will have a harder time appealing to all its customers (Anderson 
and Mittal 2000).  
Previous literature in management control suggests that one way to deal with information 
asymmetries between the headquarters and a business unit manager with local expertise is by 
delegating decision-making authority and incentives (Baiman et al. 1995). In chain organizations 
serving different locations, this solution may be achieved internally by delegating higher 
responsibility to the manager and by allocating higher compensation risk at the local unit, or 
externally by franchising some of the company’s units. Franchising is a solution that achieves 
simultaneously both decentralization of decision rights and provision of incentives. For example, 
Brickley and Dark (1987) suggest franchising control mechanisms are used to provide incentives 
to the managers running the franchised units and to cope with higher monitoring costs in 
geographically dispersed stores. Interviews with chain managers also reveal that franchising   4
mechanisms have other advantages over internal control systems when dealing with market-type 
dispersion. First, they attract franchisees with entrepreneurial and market-sensing skills that are 
superior to those possessed by company owned-store managers. Second, they attract 
entrepreneurs who are better able to bear risk. Third, they allow the company to allocate risk to 
local franchisees who, thanks to their superior knowledge of the market and their flexibility to 
adapt their operating procedures to local conditions, perceive lower risk in operating the store 
than the risk perceived by the headquarters. As the Chief Operating Officer of a large 
convenience store chain in the Northeast U.S. explained 
Franchisees are more entrepreneurial and would have more control over difficult 
situations such as adapting merchandising to local market conditions, and 
managing theft, shrinkage, and other aspects required to maintain performance. 
 
In this paper we examine whether chains use organizational design solutions (in the form of 
franchising and decentralization) to minimize the control problems arising from market-type 
dispersion. We focus on convenience store chains and conduct analyses both at a chain and at a 
store level. In the first analyses, we use 2004 TDLinx data (obtained from A.C. Nielsen 
Company) from 420 convenience store chains to explore the effect of market-type dispersion on 
chains’ decisions to franchise all, some or none of its stores. Employing an ordinal logit model, 
we find that market-type dispersion is positively associated with the chains’ decisions to 
franchise stores. This result is robust to other determinants previously explored in the literature 
including monitoring concerns arising from the chain’s geographic dispersion (Brickley and 
Dark 1987; Norton 1988) as well as chain size—a proxy used to capture the maturity of the firm 
and its need to raise money—(Caves and Murphy 1976; Lafontaine 1992).   
In the second part of our analyses, we focus on the 43 chains in our sample that own some 
stores and franchise others, and the 34,892 stores operated by those 43 chains. Conditional on a   5
firm’s decision to franchise only some of its stores, we use a fixed-effects logit model to explore 
the decision to franchise or not franchise individual stores as a function of the store-specific 
market-type divergence (i.e., the extent to which a store’s market characteristics diverge from the 
most prevalent characteristics of the chain as a whole). We find evidence supporting an 
association between the decision to franchise and the store’s market-type divergence that is 
robust to chain fixed effects as well as the store’s demographic characteristics. These latter 
findings are consistent with chains systematically choosing to franchise individual stores when 
market-type divergence is high and suggest that our chain-level results are not solely driven by 
more extensive franchising leading to expansion into multiple markets.   
Finally, we use chain-level survey data from the National Association of Convenience Stores 
(NACS) to investigate how non-franchisor chains manage market-type dispersion. Using data 
from 53 non-franchisor chains, we find strong evidence that non-franchisor chains with higher 
market-type dispersion decentralize operations more extensively than those with lower market-
type dispersion by employing less corporate and supervisory staff relative to the number of store-
level employees. We also find weak evidence suggesting that these chains provide higher 
variable pay to their store managers (estimated by dividing the store manager's bonuses by their 
total compensation). These tests are robust to other determinants of decentralization and variable 
pay, namely the chain’s geographic dispersion and size. 
 Our study contributes to the literature in accounting that describes organizational design 
solutions to control problems (such as dispersion) that are difficult to solve with internal 
information-based control systems. Several analytical and empirical studies in accounting have 
documented that the delegation of decision-making authority and the extent of incentive 
compensation are complementary organizational design choices (Baiman et al. 1995; Nagar   6
2002; Abernethy et al. 2004; Moers 2006; Widener et al. 2007). Franchising is one 
organizational design choice that simultaneously achieves both decentralization of decision 
rights and the provision of incentives (Brickley and Dark 1987; Jensen and Meckling 1992; Scott 
1995; Prendergast 2002).
2   For example, in the convenience store industry under study in this 
paper, franchising involves more delegation of decision-making authority as well as significantly 
higher amounts of variable compensation linked to accounting measures of performance than 
does company ownership. Franchise contracts in this industry typically involve a fixed, up-front 
franchise fee and royalty rates which vary from four to six percent of sales,
3 with the individual 
franchisees remaining as the residual claimants of the profits of units under their control.
4    
Contrast this with company owned units in this industry where variable pay accounts only for 
approximately 12.7 percent of total annual compensation of store managers on average.
5   
We make four specific contributions to the accounting literature on organizational design and 
control systems.  First, we introduce market-type dispersion as an important construct that gives 
rise to control problems in multi-market organizations. Second, we develop several measures of 
this new construct. Third, we use these measures to demonstrate that market-type dispersion is an 
important determinant of delegation and the provision of incentives through the organizational 
design choice of franchising, and through decentralization of operations and variable pay in non-
                                                 
2 In the typical franchise arrangement, the franchisor decentralizes decision-making authority over local production 
to the franchisee and makes the franchisee a residual claimant on their particular units (Brickley and Dark 1987; 
LaFontaine 1992; Scott 1995).  The standard contract between the principal (the franchisor) and its agents (the 
franchisees) involves an up-front franchise fee and a royalty rate on either sales or output (LaFontaine 1992; Scott 
1995).  
3 Blair and Lafontaine (2005) report that the royalty rate and franchise fee combinations are “remarkably uniform 
within chains and thus insensitive to variations in individual, outlet, and specific market conditions.” (p.54) Based 
on survey data, they also indicate that 73 percent of the franchisors adopt uniform contracts because they perceive 
them to be consistent and fair to the franchisees, while other 27 percent argues that the reason to use uniform 
contracts is to minimize transaction costs. 
4 Details on individual franchise contract terms for convenience store retailers can be found in Entrepreneur 
Magazine. 
5 Data for this calculation come from the underlying data for the 2004 National Association of Convenience Store 
Retailers Annual Compensation Survey.   7
franchisor chains. Fourth, our study focuses on observable organizational design measures 
capturing the constructs of decentralization of decision-rights and provision of incentives (i.e., 
the decision to franchise stores, the decentralization of operations through the allocation of fewer 
corporate and supervisory staff relative to the number of store-level employees, and the extent of 
variable pay). We view our focus as complementary to the existing empirical research on 
organizational design in accounting that has tended to focus on survey based perceptual 
measures of decentralization and strength of incentives (Baiman et al. 1995; Nagar 2002; 
Abernethy et al. 2004; Moers 2006; Widener et al. 2007).   
Our study also contributes to the literature related to franchising and the use of internal 
controls in geographically dispersed chain organizations. While several economics researchers 
have found empirical evidence that franchising agreements are used by chains to decrease 
agency costs in geographically dispersed locations (Caves and Murphy 1976; Brickley and Dark 
1987; Norton 1988; Brickley et al. 1991), our study examines the decision to franchise in the 
context of market-type dispersion.
6  We show that the market-type dispersion in a chain plays a 
significant role in the chain’s decision to franchise its units, over and above geographic 
dispersion. 
Overall, we view this study as an important first step in understanding how firms use 
organizational design and internal control systems to manage operations across multiple markets.  
We believe there is ample opportunity for future research to examine how firms use other aspects 
of organizational design and internal controls such as standardization, internal reporting 
                                                 
6 Interestingly, Fladmoe-Lindquist and Jacque (1995) find a result that is consistent with the notion that market-type 
dispersion is related to a firm’s decision to franchise. They find that the propensity of a group of U.S. based service 
firms to franchise internationally is related to the “cultural” distance between the franchisor and its foreign 
franchisees. They capture “cultural distance “ using a set of dummy variables indicating whether the foreign 
franchisees are located in one of six areas: Latin Europe, Nordic/Germany, Far East, Near East/Arabic, Latin 
America/Caribbean, and Independent country clusters. The Anglo area is utilized as the baseline.   8
frequency and format, and performance measurement choices to mitigate control problems 
arising from operating across multiple markets.             
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides our hypotheses 
development while Section 3 describes the sample selection. Section 4 provides a description of 
the market-dispersion measures utilized in our analyses, and Section 5 focuses on the chain level 
and store level empirical analyses as well as additional analyses on non-franchisor chains. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
II. Hypotheses Development 
Expansion into different markets may allow efficient chain organizations to strengthen (and 
derive economic rents from) their brand name; leverage their expertise and managerial skills; 
take advantage of economies of scale; and exploit the benefits of risk diversification (Berger and 
DeYoung 2001).  However, serving multiple markets may also result in negative consequences 
for the chain. Expansion into diverse markets can create higher uncertainties and reduce 
efficiency as coordination, communication, and monitoring problems arise. Specifically, an 
increase in a chain’s market-type dispersion generates two major control problems from the 
headquarters’ perspective: 
 Greater agency conflicts from monitoring 
The headquarters
7 of a chain confronts an agency problem if the store managers’ actions do 
not reflect the best interests of the company as a whole.  Monitoring store managers in highly 
dispersed locations is a challenging task, and as such, it impairs the headquarters’ ability to limit 
opportunistic store managers from engaging in shirking or perquisite-taking (Jensen and 
                                                 
7 We assume the headquarters’ interests represent the interests of the owners of the chain, that is, the interest of 
maximizing the chain’s value.   9
Meckling 1976) and from providing a lower-quality service while free-riding on the chain’s 
brand name (Brickley and Dark 1987). Chains with stores serving heterogeneous markets 
experience more information asymmetries between the store managers and the chains’ 
headquarters than chains that are geographically dispersed but serve similar types of customers 
(Landier et al. 2006).   
In these settings, the relative expertise of headquarters is likely to be diminished vis-à-vis 
store management in controlling store operations (Baiman et al. 1995). In particular, the 
problems that arise from operating across heterogeneous markets are closely related to Baiman et 
al.'s (1995) notion of ex interim information asymmetry: the headquarters information for making 
the stores operating decision is inferior as different types of customers call for distinct ways of 
operating the stores which are likely to be better understood by the local managers than by the 
headquarters.   
Greater difficulties serving customers in different markets  
While market-type dispersion has the effect of limiting the information flows to 
headquarters, it also generates a greater need to adapt to the tastes of divergent customers, 
increasing the value of the store manager’s input in the sales process (Lafontaine 1992). 
Operating a store in a highly divergent market-type requires market-sensing and entrepreneurial 
skills that are different from the operational skills that chains develop in their store managers. 
A number of studies in marketing and service operations provides evidence that different 
types of customers place different importance on the attributes that lead to customer satisfaction 
and consumption in chain organizations (Anderson and Mittal 2000; Mittal et al. 2004). For 
instance, Mattila (1999) finds that the importance customers place on the physical environment 
attribute of luxury hotels is associated with their ethnicity; Mittal et al. (2004) finds that the   10
customers’ responsiveness to automobile dealership services varies with their income, age, 
education, and ethnicity; while Campbell and Frei (2006) find that local market characteristics 
across bank branches, such as income and competition, affect customers’ evaluations of service 
quality.  Thus, a chain serving a diversity of markets requires effective controls that will 
motivate store managers to increase their efforts to adapt to the tastes of local customers while 
coordinating their actions with those of the chain headquarters. An uncontrolled expansion could 
result in an inconsistent quality of service across stores that could hurt the chain’s brand.   
The control problems in a chain with high levels of market-type dispersion could potentially 
be mitigated by (a) increasing the level of ratification and monitoring of the decisions made by 
the store managers (Fama and Jensen 1983), or (b) by delegating decision rights to the store 
managers while providing high-powered incentives based on output that would align the store 
managers’ interests to those of the chain as a whole, where the store managers would bear the 
wealth effect of their actions (Fama and Jensen 1983; Baiman et al. 1995; Prendergast 2002). On 
one hand, increasing the level of monitoring through internal control mechanisms can be 
extremely costly in organizations that are not only geographically dispersed but also dispersed 
across different types of markets.
8 On the other hand, some forms of high-powered incentive 
solutions may prove inadequate: (a) an extreme form of the incentive solution, where a store 
manager purchases all the residual claims of its units is unlikely, as a chain benefits from 
retaining certain decision rights, particularly those related to the development and protection of 
its brand (Brickley and Dark 1987; Jensen and Meckling 1992); (b) a solution providing high-
powered incentives to store managers in company-owned stores in diverse markets could also be 
                                                 
8 Notice that technological progress has facilitated the ability to control a firm’s geographic expansion. Berger and 
Young (2002) find evidence that banking organizations’ control over its affiliates has increased over time, while 
agency costs associated to geographic distance from headquarters have decreased over time. However, the effect of 
technological progress on the chains’ ability to control different types of markets is less clear.    11
very inefficient, since such managers are risk-averse and would require a high premium for 
managing a store in an uncertain market environment.  
We next develop arguments (and later test) for why delegating decision rights and providing 
high-powered incentives via franchising is an organizational solution to the information and 
control problems in stores with high levels of market-type divergence (i.e., stores in markets the 
chain does not traditionally serve). These arguments reflect discussions we have had with 
executives of convenience store chains. First, franchisees possess the entrepreneurial and market-
sensing skills needed to operate stores with high market-type divergence to a much greater extent 
than own-store managers (Bradach 1997). Second, franchisees are entrepreneurs and thus are 
better able to bear risk compared to the average store manager. Third, in many cases, franchisees 
view the risk of operating these stores to be much lower than the risk as seen by the chain.
9 
Chains see these stores as more risky because their standard operating procedures and control 
mechanisms are not suitable for the stores in these markets. Franchisees have no such issues. 
A chain franchising stores in divergent markets is able to charge franchise fees to achieve 
efficient risk sharing—given the franchisees’ willingness to bear risk—and to provide the 
incentives that limit the franchisees’ shirking behavior. Franchising motivates franchisees to 
exert the necessary effort to adapt to local needs and provide a high-quality service, as the 
franchisees retain the residual profits from their units. At the same time, franchising is a 
coordinating mechanism, since it allows the chain to retain a few decision rights that are 
necessary to maintain the quality and consistency of the brand by imposing a set of guidelines to 
                                                 
9 Prendergast (2002) notices that the introduction of high-powered incentives in an uncertain market is inconsistent 
with the tradeoff between imposing higher risk on the agent (which leads to higher cost of compensation) and 
incentivizing him/her to exert more effort.  However, she explains that higher incentives are likely to be provided to 
managers in uncertain markets since greater uncertainty leads to higher delegation of responsibility, which in turn 
generates the need for incentive pay based on output. Our prediction that market-type dispersion will lead to higher 
delegation and incentives builds on Prendergast’s argument. Further, we conjecture that the franchisees’ required 
risk premium is likely to be lower than that from a company-owned store manager given their superior 
understanding of the market   12
operate the brand (pricing, product mix selection, etc.), controlling the level of advertising, and 
retaining the right to terminate the franchise agreement if the franchisee violates the chain’s 
conditions to operate the brand (Brickley and Dark 1987).  Thus, franchising serves as an 
efficient control mechanism in the face of market-type dispersion.  
While franchising is a potential solution to the control problems confronted by chains with 
high levels of market-type dispersion, we do not expect to find this mechanism implemented in 
all chain organizations, since franchising imposes undiversified risks on the store manager 
(Lafontaine 1992) and can create hold-up problems where franchisees may under invest in their 
stores given that the franchisor has the option to take away their franchise (Shane 1998). 
Based on the arguments above, we predict that: 
Hypothesis 1: A chain's decision to franchise some or all of its stores will be positively 
associated with the extent to which its stores are dispersed across different types of 
markets. 
 
A potential limitation of testing hypothesis 1 is that market-type dispersion is an endogenous 
variable. The decision to expand into new markets resides with the chain headquarters. Thus, a 
chain level analysis may suffer from endogeneity due to (a) correlated omitted variables (i.e., 
there may be one or more unobserved variables excluded from our empirical analysis, such as the 
value of the chain’s brand, that may explain both the decision to franchise and the decision to 
expand into new markets, and thus, may be the reason why we find a correlation between 
franchising and market-type dispersion), or (b) reverse causality (i.e., it may not be clear whether 
market-type dispersion leads to more franchising, or a chain’s decision to franchise affects the 
headquarters’ decision to expand into new markets). These endogeneity concerns are mitigated if 
we test franchising decisions at the store level while controlling for chain fixed effects. Control 
problems become more severe for stores that operate in markets with marked differences from   13
the predominant market characteristics in the chain as a whole. Thus, conditional on a chain’s 
decision to franchise some but not all of its stores, we test the following prediction: 
Hypothesis 2: Chains franchising some but not all of their stores are more likely to 
franchise units in locations where market characteristics diverge more from the most 
prevalent location characteristics in each chain as a whole. 
 
III. Sample Description  
We focus our analyses on the convenience store industry for various reasons. First, for 
empirical analysis, the heterogeneity of markets that a convenience store chain faces varies 
widely across chains and can be proxied by the variations in the location demographic 
characteristics of the chains’ stores. Second, convenience store chains essentially compete on 
location and are relatively undifferentiated in other dimensions, reducing the number of factors 
to be considered for empirical analysis. Third, focusing on a relatively homogeneous industry 
allows us to control for several industry-specific conditions such as the degree of regulation or 
the extent to which store managers engage in chain-specific investments that would affect 
governance and monitoring costs (Williamson 1985). 
We use two different data sources for our analyses: the convenience stores dataset from the 
TDLinx
10 2004 Channel Database licensed to and facilitated by the National Association of 
Convenience Stores (NACS), which includes the location (address) and ownership composition 
(whether or not each store is franchised) of all convenience stores in the United States, and the 
Environmental Systems Research Institute (ESRI) 2004 Business Location Data, which tracks 
the locations of all business entities in the United States, as well as demographic information 
from the 2000 U.S. Census. We analyze the extent to which market-type dispersion affects 
franchising decisions at the chain-level using data from 420 convenience store chains with at 
                                                 
10 TDLinx is a division of A.C. Nielsen (U.S.), Inc. Its TD Channel Database covers the population of chain stores in 
the United States for several service and retail industries, one of which is convenience store chains.   14
least 20 stores each (i.e., we exclude “mom and pop” convenience stores), and at a store-level 
using data from 34,892 stores from the subset of 43 chains (out of the 420) that own some stores 
and franchise others.   
Notice that the latest U.S. Census was taken in 2000, while the TDLinx data corresponds to 
2004. As a result, the store location characteristics observed are lagged measures with respect to 
chain characteristics. Since the four year difference between the datasets is a relatively short 
period of time, population movements have most likely introduced random, rather than 
systematic, noise. Thus, the time difference for the observations in the datasets should not bias 
the results of our analyses. 
  
IV. Measurement of Market-Type Dispersion and Divergence 
Market-type variation can be measured both at the chain level and at the store level. At the 
chain level, the degree of market-type dispersion is the amount of variation in location 
characteristics among stores within a chain. For example, a chain with all of its stores in Santa 
Monica, CA would have a lower level of market-type dispersion than a chain with stores in 
Downtown LA, Santa Monica, and Sherman Oaks. At the store level, the degree of market-type 
divergence is how much a store's location demographic characteristics differ from the average 
demographic characteristics in a chain. For example, if a chain has one store in Harvard Square 
and the rest of its stores in Roxbury, then the store in Harvard Square should have higher market-
type divergence than the stores in Roxbury. In the next sub-sections we describe alternative 
measures of market-type dispersion at the chain level and market-type divergence at the store 
level. 
   15
 Measurement of Chain Level Market-Type Dispersion  
Earlier we defined market-type dispersion as the variation of certain location characteristics 
among stores within a chain.  The relevant location characteristics are the ones that affect the 
stores’ demand conditions. Therefore, to construct a measure for market-type dispersion, we first 
identify the location characteristics that are most relevant to the demand of a convenience store. 
Then, we discuss several possibilities for measuring dispersion.  
The construction of market-type dispersion is particularly important because this measure has 
not been studied in previous literature. Therefore, we construct market-type dispersion in four 
different ways and compare the regression results obtained with the different measures. 
The marketing literature has identified population density, average household size, per capita 
income, age, and ethnicity as some of the most relevant drivers of customer purchasing behavior 
in grocery and retail stores (Gupta and Chintagunta 1994; Hoch et al. 1995; Kalyanam and Putler 




(i)  stores located in highly populated (urban) areas experience higher 
sales growth (Gómez et al. 2003);  
(ii)  customers in less populated (rural) areas are more likely to travel 
beyond their local market, resulting in lost sales for the rural stores 
(Miller and Kean 1997); 
Household 
Size 
(iii) individuals from larger households prefer generic products and 
larger brand sizes, they are more price sensitive, and have a higher 
propensity to use off-price coupons due to the large amount of 
disposable income they spend in groceries (Bawa and Shoemaker 
1987; Gupta and Chintagunta 1994; Hoch et al. 1995); 
Per capita 
income and age 
(iv) customers that are younger, better educated
11, and/or wealthier 
have higher opportunity costs (due to a high marginal value of 
time), and thus, are less price and promotion sensitive (Gupta and 
Chintagunta 1994; Hoch et al. 1995); 
                                                 
11 Although we did not have a measure for education, Boatwright et al. (2004) find that wealth and education are 
highly correlated. Thus, including only one of the variables in our analysis should provide adequate results.   16
(v)  wealthier customers are more responsive to displays and feature 
advertising, consistent with the customers’ desire to decrease in-
store (displays) and out-store (advertising) search costs 
(Boatwright et al. 2004); 
Ethnicity   (vi) African-Americans spend relatively more money on generic 
grocery purchases than Whites (Wilkes and Valencia 1985);  
(vii)  the percentage of African-American and Hispanic consumers in an 
area is associated with higher price sensitivity (Mulhern and 
Williams 1994; Hoch et al. 1995; Mulhern et al. 1998). 
 
All of these location characteristics are available from the ESRI dataset (which contains data 
from the 2000 U.S. Census) at a zip-code level.  We use the U.S. Census’ definition of per capita 
income (in dollar terms) and average household size (in terms of number of persons). We 
compute population density as the number of inhabitants per square mile. For ethnicity, we 
calculate the percentage of white population, while we utilize the median age of the population to 
calculate age.   
We discuss different ways of constructing dispersion measures along the five location 
characteristics described above. One set of measures is based on the variation of individual 
location characteristics, while a second set of measures is defined utilizing cluster analysis. 
Market-Type Dispersion Based on Variation of Location Characteristics 
One way to measure dispersion is to obtain the standard deviation of each location 
characteristic L across the stores in a given chain i. However, a disadvantage of the standard 
deviation measure is that it is measured in the same units as the location characteristic L (e.g., the 
standard deviation of per capita income is measured in dollars), and thus, it cannot be compared 
to other location characteristics. To address this issue, we calculate the dispersion of each 
location characteristic L  by normalizing the standard deviation by the average value of the 





Dispersion Normalized =               (1) 
The normalized dispersion measure has no units and thus can be compared along different 
location characteristics. This measure gives a sense of the amount of variation among stores in a 
chain for a particular location characteristic, in proportion to the typical value of that location 
characteristic within the chain. To construct the chain’s overall market-type dispersion we 

















Li i Dispersion Normalized Mult n MDispersio            (3) 
The added dispersion measure would assign equal weights to the five location characteristics 
and treat them independently. The multiplied aggregated dispersion differs from the added 
aggregated dispersion because it contains interaction effects. Thus, MDispersion_Mult is more 
sensitive to extremely high or low dispersion values on any single location characteristic. For 
example, this term would place more (less) weight on the average household measure when 
income dispersion or some other location characteristic is also high (low).  
Market-Type Dispersion Based on Cluster Analysis 
A different approach for measuring market-type dispersion is to segment the markets using 
cluster analysis and then to observe the number of clusters (or “market-types”) served by each of 
the chain stores.  In line with the clustering approach of most segmentation studies in marketing 
research (Punj and Stewart 1983; Chatuverdi et al. 1997), we cluster the 29,827 zip-codes in the 
ESRI database into groups with similar location characteristics (i.e. population density, average   18
household size, per capita income, ethnicity, and age). We construct these clusters following 
three steps (Punj and Stewart 1983; Sharma 1996): 
1.  We standardize each location variable across the whole sample of zip-codes by mean 
centering it and dividing it by the location characteristic’s standard deviation. Thus 
each location variable is measured in terms of the number of standard deviations it 
deviates from the mean. 
 
2.  We estimate an a priori cluster solution using a hierarchical centroid clustering 
technique
13, to (a) determine a candidate number of clusters, and (b) identify an initial 
partition of the clusters that would not be affected by outliers (i.e. our initial partition 
does not consider small groups with less than 20 zip-codes).  
 
 
3.  Using the a priori cluster solution obtained in step 2 as a starting point, we utilize a 
non-hierarchical (K-means) technique
14 to obtain a final cluster solution. Based on this 
procedure, we obtain 25 groups of zip-codes with an R-square
15 of 81.1 percent, and 
R-squares that range between 77 (for the average household size) and 85 percent (for 
the degree of ethnicity) for the five location characteristics, suggesting our cluster 
solution has a reasonable level of homogeneity within groups and the clusters are well 
separated based on all the location variables.  
 
Using the 25 zip-code clusters (or “types of markets”), we construct two additional market-
type dispersion measures defined as the number of clusters where the stores in chain i operate 
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13 The hierarchical centroid clustering technique aggregates the zip-codes into groups by progressively grouping (in 
each iteration) the two closest zip-codes or groups of zip-codes, based on the euclidean distance among their 
location characteristics (or the average location characteristics in a zip-code group already formed, also known as 
the centroid of the group). This clustering technique suggests that the number of clusters should be determined at the 
point at which grouping the next two closest zip-codes or groups of zip-codes would significantly decrease the 
homogeneity within groups. A reason to refine the hierarchical cluster solution in step 3 is that once an observation 
is assigned to a cluster, hierarchical clustering does not allow that it be reassigned to another cluster. 
14 The a priori cluster solution from the hierarchical clustering consists of 25 clusters and their respective centroids 
(average location characteristics within the cluster). The non-hierarchical K-means technique reassigns the zip-codes 
in the a priori cluster solution to the cluster whose centroid is closest and then recalculates the new centroids of the 
25 new clusters. Reassignment continues until every case is assigned to the cluster with the nearest centroid and no 
further changes occur in the clusters. 
15 The R-square is the ratio between the [standard deviation between groups] and [the sum of the standard deviation 
between groups and the standard deviation within groups].   19
The  MDispersion_NClusti  values vary between 1 and 25, while the  MDispersion_HHIi 
measure has a minimum value of zero, if all stores in a chain are located in a single type of 
market (cluster), and a maximum value of 96 if a chain has exactly 1/25
th of its stores in each of 
the 25 clusters. 
The market dispersion measures based on clusters differ from the dispersion measures 
obtained from the variation of each of the location characteristics in different ways. First, 
MDispersion_NClust  and MDispersion_HHI are less sensitive to outliers in location 
characteristics. For instance, having a store location with average per capita income much higher 
than the rest of the chain would significantly increase the standard deviation of per capita income 
within the chain, but would have little effect on the Nclust or Herfindahl calculations of market-
type dispersion. Second, MDispersion_NClust and MDispersion_HH1 lose information on how 
stores are distributed within each cluster. Finally, MDispersion_NClust and MDispersion_HH1 
do not discriminate among which clusters the stores fall under. For instance, if there are two 
chains A and B, where chain A has half of its stores in Cluster 1 and half of its stores in Cluster 
2, while chain B has half of its stores in Cluster 1 and half of its stores in Cluster 3, then both 
chains would have the same MDispersion_NClust and MDispersion_HH1 values. However, if 
the difference between the location characteristics of Clusters 1 and 2 is greater than the 
difference in location characteristics in Clusters 1 and 3, then under MDispersion_Sum and 
MDispersion_Mult, chain A would be more dispersed than chain B.  
 
 
 Measurement of Store Level Market-Type Divergence   20
As defined earlier, market-type divergence at the store level is the extent to which the store’s 
location characteristics differ from the average location characteristics in the chain. To 
differentiate these measures from those at the chain level, we refer to store-level dispersion 
measures as “market divergence” measures.  As in the case of the chain level dispersion 
measures, we use population density, average household size, per capita income, ethnicity, and 
age, as the relevant location characteristics.  
We construct two sets of market divergence measures: the first is based on the divergence 
between the store’s individual location characteristics and the chain’s average characteristics, 
while the second is defined in terms of the clusters identified for each chain. 
Market-Type Divergence Based on Individual Location Characteristics 
To calculate market divergence at the store level, we calculate the absolute value of the 
difference between the value of a location characteristic L for store j, and the average value of 
location characteristic L across all stores in chain i, that is, 
__
i ij L L − . This measure has different 
units for different location characteristics (e.g. per capita income divergence is measured in 
dollar terms, while average household size is measured in number of persons). To make the 
measures of different location characteristics comparable, we normalize this divergence measure 
by the standard deviation of the L values for all stores in chain i. Thus, we define for each 








=            (5) 
This measure indicates how many standard deviations store j’s location characteristic L is 
away from the chain i’s average. We aggregate this normalized divergence metrics, through   21
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As in the case of the chain level dispersion measures, the aggregated divergence metric 
constructed through addition would treat the five market characteristic dimensions as 
independent of one another, while the aggregated divergence measure constructed through 
multiplication would contain interaction effects for the different location characteristics.  
Market-Type Divergence Based on Cluster Analysis 
Using the 25 market clusters identified at the chain level, we construct a measure of store 
level divergence that captures the divergence between the store’s cluster and the most frequent 
cluster in the chain, weighted by the frequency of the main cluster. The measure is calculated as 
follows: 
MDivergence_mainclustij = %mainclusti * distanceij             (8) 
where, 
%mainclust = is the percentage of stores in the most frequent cluster in chain i 
distance = is the distance between the centroids of the store j's cluster and the chain's most 







cm cj L L , where 
__
cj L  is the average value of location   22
characteristic L in store j’s cluster, while 
__
cm L  is the average value of location characteristic L in 
the chain’s most frequent cluster.
16  
To summarize, the two methods for calculating dispersion at the chain level and divergence 
at the store level are: (1) measures based on the variation of individual location characteristics 
that lead to the MDispersion_Sum and MDispersion_Mult measures at the chain level, and to the 
MDivergence_Sum and MDivergence_Mult measures at the store level; and (2) measures based 
on 25 different clusters (types of markets), which include MDispersion_NClust  and 
MDispersion_HH1 at the chain level, and MDivergence_mainclust at the store level. 
 
V. Research Methodology and Empirical Results  
Chain-Level Methodology 
To test Hypothesis 1—i.e., to investigate whether a positive association exists between a 
chain’s decision to franchise its stores and market-type dispersion—we perform multivariate 
tests, where the dependent variable captures the chain’s decision to franchise none, some, or all 
of its stores and the main explanatory variable consists of the chain’s market-type dispersion 
(MDISPERSION measured as MDispersion_Sum, MDispersion_Mult, or MDispersion_HHI as 
described in Section 4). A general specification of the model is described by the following 
equation: 
FRANCHISINGi = f ( MDISPERSIONi, CHAIN_STATEHHIi, CHAIN_NSTORESi) 
Our multivariate approach consists of estimating an Ordinal Logit Model where the 
franchising variable is a categorical variable equal to 0 if the chain owns all of its stores, 1 if it 
franchises some but not all of its stores, and 2 if it franchises all of its stores. We include two 
                                                 
16 Whenever the chain had more than one "most frequent" cluster, then the distance is calculated relative to the 
closest "most frequent" cluster.   23
control variables, identified by the previous literature as determinants of a chain’s decision to 
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∑           (9) 
This measure varies between 0 (if all stores in a chain are located in one state) and 98 (if a 
chain has 1/50
th of its stores in each of the 50 states). Monitoring costs (and thus, the propensity 
to franchise) tend to be higher if stores are spread across multiple locations and if stores are 
isolated, instead of surrounded by other stores from the same chain (Brickley and Dark 1987; 
Brickley et al. 1991).  CHAIN_STATEHHI captures both of these dimensions as it measures the 
extent to which a chain's stores are dispersed across multiple states.
17 Consequently, we expect 
that  CHAIN_STATEHHI will be positively related to franchising. The second measure, 
CHAIN_NSTORES is the number of stores in the chain. On one hand, this measure captures the 
level of maturity of the firm and should indicate a smaller need for franchising as a means to 
raise capital (Carney and Gedajlovic 1991; Lafontaine 1992). Such interpretation would lead us 
to expect a negative relation to franchising. On the other hand, franchising and the chain’s 
number of stores are endogenously determined since chains that franchise more might be able to 
grow larger, leading to a positive relation between both measures. Thus we make no prediction 
on this control variable. 
Store-Level Methodology 
Conditional on a chain’s decision to own some of its stores and franchise others, we examine 
whether a positive association exists between franchising and market-type dispersion at a store 
                                                 
17Measuring geographic dispersion of a chain at the state-level is consistent with previous research on chain-level 
franchising decisions (Scott 1995).  All of our results are robust to measuring geographic dispersion using more 
granular geographic areas such as counties or zip codes.      24
level (i.e., hypothesis 2). We run the following logit regression model on the sub-sample of 
stores j belonging to chains i that franchise some, but not all of their stores: 
Pr (FRANCHISEij) = f ( MDIVERGENCEij, DISTANCE HQij,  
NSTORES_ZIPCHAINij, CHAIN FIXED EFFECTSij)    (10) 
The dependent variable of this model is a dummy equal to 1 if the store is a franchisee and 
zero otherwise. The main explanatory variable is the MDIVERGENCE measure which can be 
measured using any of the store-level market divergence measures: MDivergence_Sum, 
MDivergence_Mult, and MDivergence_mainclust, (see Section 4). We expect these measures to 
be positively related to the store’s likelihood of being franchised.   
We control for geographic dispersion using two control measures: DISTANCE_HQ, which is 
the distance in miles between the store’s zip code and the headquarters’ zip code, and 
NSTORES_ZIPCHAIN which is the number of same chain stores within the store’s zip-code. The 
former measure is expected to be positively related, while the latter measure is expected to be 
negatively related, to the store’s likelihood of being franchised. Finally, we control for chain 
fixed effects. Controlling for chain fixed effects allows us to mitigate omitted variables concerns 
at the chain-level, such as the chain’s need to raise money or the chain’s value of the brand 
(Brickley and Dark 1987; Lafontaine 1992).
18  
                                                 
18 For our store-level analyses, we estimate logits with chain-indicators.  It is well known that coefficient estimates 
from logit models which include dummy variables to directly estimate fixed effects are biased (Madalla 1987).  
However, holding the number of cross-sectional groups constant, the coefficient bias in these models tends to 0 as 
the number of within-group observations increases (Wooldridge 2002).  For our store-level analyses, we have only 
43 chains with an average of 811 stores per chain and only 4 of these chains operate less than 50 stores (and more 
than 20).  Thus, our panel dataset is characterized by a small number of groups, each with a large number of within-
group observations and is ideally suited for estimation by logit with group (e.g chain) dummies.  We also tested the 
robustness of our results to the fixed-effects logit model of Chamberlain (1980).  However, this model is 
computationally difficult for datasets with very large numbers of within group observations (Greene 1993; Baltagi 
1995).  We were not able to get this model to converge when including the largest chains in our sample (e.g. chains 
with greater than 1,000 stores).  We estimated the Chamberlain fixed-effects logit model on the sample of chains 
with less than 1,000 stores each and found substantively similar results to those reported in Table 7.  For the sample 
of chains with over 1,000 stores each, we also estimated a basic logit specification with chain indicators and, again,   25
Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics for our sample of 420 chains with at least 20 stores are provided in Table 
1. Convenience store chains in our sample vary widely on all measures of market dispersion. 
Chains compete in approximately 11 different "market-types" (MDISPERSION_NCLUST) on 
average and range from competing in only one market types to competing across all 25 market 
types identified in our cluster analysis of zip code  demographics.     Chains in our sample also 
show considerable variation in geographic dispersion ranging from concentrating all stores 
within a single state (CHAIN_STATEHHI=0) to coming close to equally dispersing stores across 
all 50 states (CHAIN_STATEHHI=96). The average chain in our sample has 152 stores.    
[TABLE 1 APPROX. HERE] 
Only 14 percent of chains in our sample operate any of their stores as franchises.  However, 
we note that the total number of stores operated by this 14 percent of chains represents 61% of 
the stores operated by all chains in our sample.
19   Further information on the distribution of 
franchise activity in our sample is provided in Table 2 which shows that 10.2 percent of sample 
chains organize by franchising some, but not all stores while 3.3 percent operate all stores as 
franchises. Chains that do franchise some, but not all, stores vary widely in their franchising 
decisions, operating approximately 53 percent of their stores as franchises on average, with the 
proportion of stores franchised ranging from 0.2 to 99.6 percent.   Table 3 demonstrates that our 
measures of chain-level market-type dispersion show only small to moderate correlations with 
measures of geographic dispersion.   
[TABLES 2 AND 3 APPROX. HERE] 
                                                                                                                                                             
found substantively similar results.  This latter sample would be highly unlikely to suffer from biased coefficient 
estimates as it consists of only 10 chains with an average of 2,594 stores per chain.            
19 The 420 chains in our sample collectively operate 63,933 stores.  Chains that franchise at least some of their stores 
collectively operate 38,991 stores.    26
  Summary statistics for the sample of 34,892 stores belonging to the 43 chains which 
franchise some, but not all of their stores are provided in Table 4 which shows that 69 percent of 
such stores are franchised. Stores in the sample vary widely on all measures of market-type 
divergence. Not surprisingly, there is also wide variation across all the demographic 
characteristics used to construct the market-type divergence measures.  The average store is 658 
miles away from chain headquarters and operates in a zip-code with 2 stores from the same 
chain. Table 5 demonstrates that our measures of store-level market-type divergence show only 
small correlations with measures of geographic dispersion.      
[TABLES 4 AND 5 APPROX. HERE] 
 
Chain-Level Empirical Results 
The ordinal-logit specifications in Table 6 demonstrate results on the association between the 
likelihood of franchising and geographic dispersion that are consistent with prior literature on the 
determinants of franchising.  Consistent with higher monitoring costs associated with geographic 
dispersion of business units (Brickley and Dark 1987; Scott 1995), chains that are more 
geographically disperse (CHAIN_STATEHHI) are more likely to franchise some or all of their 
stores (p<.05 in all specifications).  The results in Table 6 provide strong evidence in support of 
Hypothesis 1. When measured by MDISPERSION_SUM,  MDISPERSION_MULT, or 
MDISPERSION_HHI, market dispersion is positively and significantly related to the likelihood 
of franchising (p<.10 in all specifications).
20   
To gauge the economic significance of these results, our coefficient estimates suggest that, 
holding size and geographic dispersion constant at their mean values, a chain with the mean level 
                                                 
20 We replicate our analysis by substituting the dependent variable with the percentage of stores franchised by each 
chain (including 0 percent  for those that franchised none, and 100 percent  for those that franchised all stores) and 
find essentially the same results.   27
of market dispersion measured as MDISPERSION_HHI has a 96.9, 2.7, and 0.4 percent 
probability of franchising no, some, or all stores respectively.  By contrast, holding all other 
variables at their mean values, a chain for which MDISPERSION_HHI is one standard deviation 
above the mean has a 67.3, 26.5, and 6.3 percent probability of franchising no, some, or all stores 
respectively. Overall, these results support the hypothesis that, after controlling for geographic 
dispersion, chains are more likely to use franchising when operating across diverse market-types 
(Hypothesis 1).      
[TABLE 6 APPROX. HERE] 
Store-Level Empirical Results  
The logit specifications in Table 7 demonstrate results on the association between the 
likelihood of franchising a given store and measures of geographic distance and concentration 
which are consistent with prior literature (e.g., Brickley and Dark 1987). Geographic distance 
from headquarters (DISTANCE_HQ) is positively and significantly (p<.001) related to the 
probability of franchising a store while the number of stores in the same zip code operated by the 
chain with which the store is affiliated (NSTORES_ZIPCHAIN) is negatively and significantly 
(p<.001) related to the probability of franchising a store in all specifications.   
The results in Table 7 provide evidence in support of Hypothesis 2. When measured by 
MDIVERGENCE_SUM, MDIVERGENCE_MULT or  MDIVERGENCE_MAINCLUST,  market-
type divergence is positively and significantly related to the likelihood of franchising as 
predicted (p<.001 for all measures).  
To gauge the economic significance of these results, our coefficient estimates suggest that, 
holding distance to headquarters and the number of same-chain stores in the zip code constant at 
their mean values, the probability of a store with the mean level of market-type divergence being   28
franchised is approximately 71percent regardless of the measure of market-type divergence used.   
By contrast, holding all other variables at their mean values, the probability of the most divergent 
store in a chain being franchised is approximately 76, 82, or 75 percent on average when market-
type divergence is measured by MDIVERGENCE_SUM, MDIVERGENCE_MULT, or 
MDIVERGENCE_MAINCLUST respectively.  Overall, these results support the hypothesis that, 
after controlling for geographic dispersion, chains are more likely to franchise stores located in 
markets with characteristics that diverge most significantly from the predominant characteristics 
of markets in which the chain operates (Hypothesis 2).  These results are also consistent with 
chains systematically choosing to franchise individual stores when market-type divergence is 
high and suggest that our chain-level results are not solely driven by reverse-causality in the 
form of more extensive franchising leading to higher market type dispersion via expansion into 
multiple markets.   
[TABLE 7 APPROX. HERE] 
Organizational Design Choices in Non-Franchisor Chains 
As shown in Table 2, the majority of chains in our sample (86 percent) do not franchise any 
of their stores. Given our predictions on the role of franchising in managing heterogeneity in 
market types, it is interesting to explore whether non-franchisor chains use other forms of 
decentralization and allocation of risk to manage market-type dispersion. These firms may 
control the problems arising from market dispersion by providing stronger incentive 
compensation in the form of bonus-based pay to their store managers and by decentralizing their 
operations more extensively. However, as discussed in section 2, this potential solution to market 
dispersion may not be feasible given the significantly lower "entrepreneurial spirit" and higher 
risk aversion of company-owned store managers relative to franchisees (Bradach 1997).   29
To investigate this possibility, we use a sample of 53 non-franchisor convenience store 
chains with at least five stores each. The data is obtained by matching (1) market and geographic 
dispersion data calculated from the TDLinx data and U.S. Census data described above, and (2) 
data from two chain-level surveys conducted in 2004 by the National Association of 
Convenience Stores (NACS), reporting human resources data (“State of the Industry Survey”) 
and compensation data (“Compensation Survey”). Using these data, we conduct the following 
two Ordinary Least Squares regressions:  
CENTRALIZATIONi = f ( MDISPERSIONi, CHAIN_STATEHHIi, CHAIN_NSTORESi)      (11) 
VARIABLEPAYi = f ( MDISPERSIONi, CHAIN_STATEHHIi, CHAIN_NSTORESi)        (12) 
where CENTRALIZATION is calculated by dividing the number of corporate and supervisory 
staff by the number of store level employees; VARIABLEPAY is measured as the average store 
manager bonus divided by the average total pay for the store-manager (including both bonus and 
salary-based pay) in the chain; and MDISPERSION is measured as MDispersion_Sum, 
MDispersion_Mult, or MDispersion_HHI as described in Section 4. As before, we control for 
geographic dispersion (CHAIN_STATEHHI) and for the number of stores in the chain 
(CHAIN_NSTORES). 
The results in Table 8 are broadly consistent with the notion that decentralization of 
operations may be an alternative to franchising as an organizational design choice for managing 
market-type dispersion. As expected, all measures of market dispersion are negatively and 
significantly (p<.10) associated with our measure of CENTRALIZATION (i.e, the proportion of 
corporate and supervisory staff relative to the number of store level employees). We also find 
consistent results that market dispersion is positively associated with higher levels of 
VARIABLEPAY, although this result is weak and is significant for only one of the three market   30
dispersion measures. This  weaker result may be explained by (a) the lack of power of our small 
sample tests; (b) the fact that store managers of company owned firms tend to be risk averse and 
may command a high risk premium for undertaking the uncertainty of operating in diverse 
markets.     
[TABLE 8 APPROX. HERE] 
VI. Conclusions 
Chain organizations operate units which are typically dispersed across different types of 
markets, and thus serve significantly divergent customer bases. Such market-type dispersion is 
likely to compromise the headquarters’ ability to control its stores for two reasons:  First, relative 
differences in local conditions make it difficult to monitor the store manager’s behavior.  Second, 
a chain with wide-ranging customer bases will have a harder time serving its customers and will 
need to rely more heavily on the store managers’ ability to adapt to local needs. 
In this paper we show that chains experiencing higher levels of market-type dispersion are 
more likely to increase delegation and the provision of incentives through the organizational 
design choice of franchising, presumably to cope with the control problems described.  We show 
that a chain’s decision to franchise some or all of its stores is related to market-type dispersion, 
measured in several alternative ways, and that this result is robust to other determinants 
previously explored in the literature including the chain’s geographic dispersion. We also 
examine the decision to franchise at a store level for the subset of chains that own some stores 
and franchise others. We predict, and find, that stores whose location characteristics are more 
divergent from the most prevalent location characteristics of the chain as a whole, are more 
likely to be franchised. Finally, additional analyses suggest that non-franchisor chains with   31
higher levels of market-type dispersion tend to decentralize operations to a greater extent and to 
provide higher variable pay (although this latter result is weak).  
Our study is relevant to the academic literature since it identifies an important factor (market-
type dispersion) that is systematically related to firms' organizational design choices, and to 
practitioners, such as managers and consultants, dealing with control challenges related to a 
chain’s geographic expansion into different markets. However, our study is limited in (a) the 
extent to which franchising is explained, as we are unable to observe differences in the 
franchising contracts utilized by the chains analyzed (e.g., fixed fees, royalties), and to identify 
who the franchisees are (thus, limiting our ability to distinguish franchisees that operate one store 
from those that operate more than one store), (b) the extent to which we can explain 
decentralization and variable pay in non-franchisor chains (due to data limitations and 
unavailable store-level data).  Nevertheless, regardless of the terms of the franchising agreements 
and the small sample utilized to analyze non-franchisor chains, our results confirm a relationship 
between market-type dispersion and organizational design choices related to delegation and the 
provision of incentives.                                                                                                                                              32
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics for the Chain-Level Dataset (N=420 Chains) 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Market Dispersion Measures        
MDISPERSION_NCLUST  11.1 5.3  1  25 
MDISPERSION_SUM  1.97 0.58 0.56  5.16 
MDISPERSION_MULT  0.001 0.002 0.000002 0.01 
MDISPERSION_HHI  79.2 12.1 0 96.4 
        
Geographic Dispersion Measures        
CHAIN_STATEHHI  26.7 30.5 0 96.4 
        
Chain Characteristics        
CHAIN_NSTORES  152  463.5 20 5758 
CHAIN_FRANCHISOR  0.14  0.34 0 1 
Notes: 
MDISPERSION_SUM: Market-type dispersion measured as the aggregate sum of individual normalized 
dispersion measures based on location characteristics (population, income, age, ethnicity, household size). 
MDISPERSION_MULT: Market-type dispersion measured as the aggregate product of individual 
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CHAIN_NSTORES: Total number of stores operated by the chain 
CHAIN_FRANCHISOR: Indicator for whether a chain franchises any of its stores  37
Table 2 




Chains %  Sample
Mean % of 
Stores Franchised
Minimum % of  
Stores Franchised 
Maximum % of  
Stores Franchised
No Franchised Stores  363 86.4  0  0  0 
Some Franchised Stores*  43 10.2  52.5  0.2  99.6 
All Franchised Stores  14 3.3  100  100  100 
*Some Franchised Stores: 0 < % of Chain's Stores Franchised < 1 
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Table 3 
Chain-Level Correlations between Measures of Geographic and Market-Type Dispersion 
 
 
   CHAIN_STATEHHI MDISPERSION_SUM MDISPERSION_MULT
CHAIN_STATEHHI  1    
MDISPERSION_SUM  0.3161* 1  
MDISPERSION_MULT  0.2757* 0.4129*  1 
MDISPERSION_HHI  0.3210* 0.2792*  0.3280* 








numberof stores in state X in chain i





MDISPERSION_SUM: Market-type dispersion measured as the aggregate sum of individual normalized dispersion 
measures based on location characteristics (population, income, age, ethnicity, household size). 
MDISPERSION_MULT: Market-type dispersion measured as the aggregate product of individual normalized 
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Table 4 
Summary Statistics for the Store-Level Dataset (N=34,892) 
 
Variable Mean  Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum
Franchise Choice       
FRANCHISE    0.69 0.46  0.00 1.00 
        
Market Divergence Measures       
MDIVERGENCE_SUM  3.6  2.0 0.3  25.4 
MDIVERGENCE_MULT  0.87 7.4  3.81x10
-8 548.6 
MDIVERGENCE_MAINCLUST  48.3 32.0  0.0 323.5 
       
Geographic Divergence Measures       
DISTANCE_HQ  658 624  0 4,701 
NSTORES_ZIPCHAIN  2.0 1.8  1.0  23.0 
        
Zip Code Demographic Characteristics       
% White Population  73.9 21.8  0.5  100 
Average Household Size  2.6 0.4  1.3 5.4 
Median Income  52,954 18,573  10,830  192,006 
Median Age  36.4 5.4  19.1  74.8 
Population per Square Mile  2,700 4,065  0.003  96,990 
Notes: 
FRANCHISE: Indicator for whether or not store is franchised 
MDIVERGENCE_SUM: Market-type divergence measured as the sum of the absolute values of normalized differences on each location characteristic between 
the store and the average value of the location characteristic for the chain.  
MDISPERSION_MULT: Market-type divergence measured as the product of the absolute values of normalized differences on each location characteristic 
between the store and the average value of the location characteristic for the chain. 
MDISPERSION_MAINCLUST: Cluster distance between the store’s cluster and the most frequent cluster in the chain, weighted by the proportion of the chain's 
stores in the main cluster 
DISTANCE_HQ: Distance in miles from chain headquarters to store 
NSTORES_ZIPCHAIN: Number of same-chain stores in the zip code (stores which are operated by the same chain with which the store is affiliated)  
   40
 
Table 5 
Store-Level Correlations between Measures of Geographic and Market-Type Divergence 
 
   DISTANCE_HQ NSTORES_ZIPCHAIN MDIVERGENCE_SUM MDIVERGENCE_MULT MDIVERGENCE_MAINCLUST
DISTANCE_HQ  1        
NSTORES_ZIPCHAIN  0.1297* 1       
MDIVERGENCE_SUM  0.0924* -0.0574*  1     
MDIVERGENCE_MULT  0.0218* -0.0241*  0.4441*  1   
MDIVERGENCE_MAINCLUST  -0.1714* 0.1034*  0.6370*  0.2277*  1 
* Significant (p<.10) 
Notes: 
DISTANCE_HQ: Distance in miles from chain headquarters to store 
NSTORES_ZIPCHAIN: Number of same-chain stores in the zip code (stores which are operated by the same chain with which the store is affiliated)  
MDIVERGENCE_SUM: Market-type divergence measured as the sum of the absolute values of normalized differences on each location characteristic between 
the store and the average value of the location characteristic for the chain.  
MDISPERSION_MULT: Market-type divergence measured as the product of the absolute values of normalized differences on each location characteristic 
between the store and the average value of the location characteristic for the chain. 
MDISPERSION_MAINCLUST: Cluster distance between the store’s cluster and the most frequent cluster in the chain, weighted by the proportion of the chain's 
stores in the main cluster 
   41
Table 6 
Ordinal Logit Regressions Linking the Likelihood of Franchising No, Some, or All 






Predicted Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  Model 4 
 
CHAIN_STATEHHI +  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.014 
p-value   0.00 0.00  0.000 0.01 
  
CHAIN_NSTORES  ?  0.001 0.001  0.0003  0.0001 
p-value   0.009 0.006 0.084  0.16 
  
MDISPERSION_SUM +    0.45    
p-value    0.07    
  
MDISPERSION_MULT +     318.3   
p-value      0.007   
  
MDISPERSION_HHI +      0.24 
p-value       0.00 
  









Dependent variable in all specifications = 1 if chain does not franchise any stores; 2 if chain franchises 







numberof stores in state X in chain i





CHAIN_NSTORES: Total number of stores operated by the chain 
MDISPERSION_SUM: Market-type dispersion measured as the aggregate sum of individual normalized 
dispersion measures based on location characteristics (population, income, age, ethnicity, household size). 
MDISPERSION_MULT: Market-type dispersion measured as the aggregate product of individual 
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Table 7 
Logit Regressions Linking the Probability of Franchising an Individual Store to 
Measures of Market Divergence and Geographic Concentration 
 
 
   Logits 
Predicted  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
 
Constant +  0.88 0.87  0.61 
p-value   0.00 0.00  0.00 
 
DISTANCE_HQ +  0.0008 0.0009  0.0008 
p-value   0.00 0.00  0.00 
   
NSTORES_ZIPCHAIN -  -0.03 -0.025  -0.04 
p-value   0.002 0.033  0.001 
  
MDIVERGENCE_SUM +  0.05    
p-value   0.00    
  
MDIVERGENCE_MULT +   0.008   
p-value    0.00   
  
MDIVERGENCE_MAINCLUST +     0.009 
p-value      0.000 
  
Chain Indicators    Yes Yes  Yes 
 







Dependent variable in all specifications = 1 store is franchised; 0 if store is company owned 
Chain indicators are jointly significant (p<.001). 
DISTANCE_HQ: Distance in miles from chain headquarters to store 
NSTORES_ZIPCHAIN: Number of same-chain stores in the zip code (stores which are operated by the 
same chain with which the store is affiliated)  
MDIVERGENCE_SUM: Market-type divergence measured as the sum of the absolute values of normalized 
differences on each location characteristic between the store and the average value of the location 
characteristic for the chain.  
MDISPERSION_MULT: Market-type divergence measured as the product of the absolute values of 
normalized differences on each location characteristic between the store and the average value of the 
location characteristic for the chain. 
MDISPERSION_MAINCLUST: Cluster distance between the store’s cluster and the most frequent cluster in 
the chain, weighted by the proportion of the chain's stores in the main cluster.   43
Table 8 
OLS Regressions Linking Centralization and Variable Pay with Market Dispersion, Geographic Dispersion, and Chain Size 
 
   Dependent Variable = 
  CENTRALIZATION VARIABLEPAY 
   Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
CHAIN_STATEHHI  0.0004 0.0005 0.0004  -0.0016  -0.0022  -0.0017 
p-value  (0.16) (0.12) (0.21)  (0.12)  (0.12)  (0.18) 
CHAIN_NSTORES  -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.00002  -0.00003 -0.00004 -0.00004 
p-value  (0.04) (0.01) (0.10)  (0.43)  (0.39)  (0.35) 
MDISPERSION_SUM  -0.0238     0.0421   
p-value  (0.007)    (0.08)    
MDISPERSION_MULT    -20.304     32.228   
p-value   (0.003)    (0.44)  
MDISPERSION_HHI     -0.1261     0.0875 
p-value     (0.061)      (0.42) 
Constant  0.1489 0.1182 0.2003  0.1102  0.1695  0.1234 
p-value  (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.09) 
Observations 53  53  53  53  53  53 
Adjusted R-squared  0.059  0.062  0.062  0.027  0.016  0.010 
Notes:  
CENTRALIZATION = (Number of corporate and supervisory staff)/(number of store-level employees) 
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CHAIN_NSTORES: Total number of stores operated by the chain 
MDISPERSION_SUM: Market-type dispersion measured as the aggregate sum of individual normalized dispersion measures based on location characteristics 
(population, income, age, ethnicity, household size). 
MDISPERSION_MULT: Market-type dispersion measured as the aggregate product of individual normalized dispersion measures based on location 







numberof stores in cluster X in chain i
total numberof stores in chain i =
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